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FOREWORD 
Information Service for Officers was established by the Chief 
of Naval Personnel in 1948. Published herewith is the first issue of 
Volume II. 
V Qlume II, like Volume I, will contain lectures and articles con­
sidered of professional interest to offi�ers of the naval service. Opin­
ions expressed in this publication are those of the author and not 
necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College. 
The many valuable suggestions ofl'ered by readers of Volume I 
are acknowledged. These have been carefully considered and many 
will be incorporated in Volume II. 
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LEADERSHIP 
a lecture delivered by 
Dr. Douglas S. Freeman 
at the Naval War College 
May 11, 1949 
I am certainly grateful to the Admiral for his introduction. 
Speech-making is bad enough in any event-it's a terrible thing­
but I don't know that it's any worse than speech-listening. The 
worst thing about it is having what is known as a Who's Who intro­
duction. Some man with an edition of Who's Who about ten years 
old gets up and gives everybody your biography from Who's Who, 
and by the time he gets through you say to yourself, "Well God 
knows there is but one thing left to do and that is to bury me." Of 
course when I get up, there are a good many who think that if I 
have not been buried and dug up, at least I am what they some­
times call me at Army and Navy schools, "the Rip Van Winkle of the 
armed services." That is because I have had the pleasure of study­
ing the history of our armed forces for a period of now almost forty 
years. 
When I was a lad I had the great pleasure, the infinite honor, 
of seeing some of the great men of the war between the states. 
Strange as it seems, I can remember Jubal Early. What a somber 
(I almost said a sinister) figure he was as he walked around town, 
chewing tobacco fiercely and leaning on a long staff. As soon as we 
little lads would see him we would run away because it was thorough­
ly understood among all of us lads of about five years old or there­
abouts that General Early ate a little boy for breakfast every day. 
I remember John B. Gordon; I remember Fitzhugh Lee; I re­
member James Longstreet. I knew well a number of the younger 
Doctor Freeman is one of Virginia's most distinguished citizens. 
Since 1915 he has been editor of the Richmond News Leader. He has 
lectured extensively at various service colleges and has written a num­
ber of books including Robert E. Lee (Pulitzer Prize 1934) and Lee's
Lieutenants. He is now writing the biography of George Washington. 
Dr. Freeman has not edited these remarks. 
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staff officers of General Lee and General Jackson. I knew personally 
and talked often with three of General Lee's staff officers, one of 
them his Assistant Adjutant General, and of course I knew the 
leaders of the Spanish War, of the First World War and of the 
Second World War. Many of these men of the Second World War 
I taught at the War College. And it was amusing beyond ex­
pression to go to headquarters immediately after · hostilities, to go 
to General Eisenhower's headquarters, or to General Clark's head­
quarters, or to General MacArthur's headquarters and see some of 
these men I had known as majors at the War College, stand up 
and say, "My God, am I going to have my historical photograph 
taken now?" So those are the circumstances that make me feel, as 
it were, that I am the Rip Van Winkle of the armed services. 
But no man can go through this long stretch of years and 
have the honor of seeing these great men without having an admira­
tion for them, an admiration for the service and a ;reverence for the 
leadership that these men exemplify. I have seen a new chapter of it 
during the last year because I have been studying George Wash­
ington after he came to the command of the American Army in 
June 1775. Nothing that he had ever done before showed the 
qualities that he then displayed. I don't think anybody who studied 
Washington as he was in 1759 is prepared for what Washington 
was in 1775. I think strangely enough, that out of his civilian 
training, out of all the difficulties he had to endure, there developed 
the patience, the maturity of judgment, the essential sanity that 
were the hallmark of the remarkable ability of that man. 
You know we look at Washington usually through the silly, 
stupid pages of Parson Weems or as we see him in the portraits of 
Gilbert Stuart. I think either approach is wrong. Washington 
wasn't the stupid prig that he is made out to be by Weems, nor 
was he the embalmed celebrity that he appears to be in Gilbert 
2 
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Stuart's portraits. Of course, many of the portraits of Gilbert
Stuart are pretty good works of art of the type and of the age 
(he made a good living in portraits of George Washington), but per­
sonally, except for the one at the Boston Art Museum, I'd like 
to see all the Gilbert Stuart's of Washington destroyed. I wish 
they were all burned up because they give such a false impression 
of the man. The Peal portraits of him, even the Trumbull portraits, 
have so much more of the vitality that was Washington-the 
sanity, the judgment, the humanity that was his. You who are 
older used to see George Washington presented to you in front of 
the East Portico of the Capitol. Washington, being a modest man, 
I think would have been very much embarrassed if he had seen 
how nearly naked he was presented in that statue of him in front 
of the Capitol where he sits in a Roman toga which would suit 
Washington weather in July and no other weather in the world. 
And he sits there with his hand outstretched as if saying, as 
Lorado Taft used to put it, "My body lies over at Mount Vernon­
my clothes in the Pension Office. 
He exemplified leadership which is not anything like as com­
plicated as some of the psychologists would make it out to be. 
Psychology is going to be a great subject one of these days. Now 
it's just in its infancy, and when we try to apply it in the 
abstract to problems of leadership we usually make monkeys of 
ourselves; we don't get very far. Leadership is fundamentally 
common-sense and mankind. Maybe I'm going to over-simplify 
it for you this afternoon, because I'm going to say that it con­
sists fundamentally of three things and three only. If a man 
meets these three conditions he is going to be a leader; if he fails 
to meet them he may be on the roster as the head of a command, 
but he will never be at the head of that command when it marches 
down the pages of history-never! 
First, know your stuff. Know your stuff, just that. If you 
3 
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are an aviator, know it. And know something else besides. We 
are entirely too much disposed in the American armed services 
now to have men who begin their professional career on too narrow 
a foundation and they go up and up and up, and the higher they 
go the thinner their knowledge is. We have to have specialists . 
but very few of them can afford to be primarily the leaders of 
men. Our advanced specialists, they must be men who know 
something about leadership but they are primarily laboratory men 
-research men. The leader must have a broad foundation if he
is going to keep his position. Know-know. your own branch, know
the related arms of the service; you can't know too much if you
are going to be a successful leader. And know the yesterdays. I
have always said, and said many times here at the War College
through the years, "Don't rely on us military historical writers
too much. We don't know but so much. We can't fight wars." But
after all don't ignore the yesterdays of war in your study of today
and of tomorrow.
I always thought that one of the finest things that ever was 
said about MacArthur was that when he had a period in which 
he was relieved of active administrative duties and was for three 
months able to do as he pleased, he took those three months and 
caught up on everything that he could read in order to bring his 
knowledge of today into line with the yesterdays of war. The 
same thing is true of Marshall. Marshall is one of the most avid 
readers of military history that I know. The same thing is true 
. of Nimitz. Of course Nimitz sometimes made bad choices of his 
reading. He said to me one time for example, "Ah, Doctor, you never 
will know how grateful I am to you," and he mentioned one of my 
books that he had read at Guam while he was in command there. 
I said, "How is that, Admiral?" "Well," he replied, "every night 
after I had finished my duties I would go to bed and turn on the 
light and I would read for about half an hour of some of General 
4 
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Lee's problems in dealing with his subordinates. Then I would go 
peacefully to sleep, because I would reason then that General
Lee's problems of command were infinitely greater than mine were, 
and that I had a far easier time with my subordinates than he 
had with his." I said, "Admiral, you never were more mistaken 
in your life; you had "cuckoos" and some "prima donnas" with you 
and I'll not argue with you about that, but what put you to sleep 
was not peace of mind-it was my style." 
Know your stuff-know your specialty, know the back­
ground of military history. Know it so that when the man comes 
up to you and says, �'What do I do in these circumstances, with 
this weapon, with this gun?", you can tell him, and if you don't 
know and want to be a leader, then for Heaven's sake tell him hon­
estly, "I don't know." A man very seldom loses the respect of his 
men if he says he doesn't know something when he can dem­
onstrate that he knows something else, but look out for that man 
who tries to bluff about his knowledge. 
I was dealing one time with a very tough audience and I 
happened during the course of my remarks to say something about 
Iwo Jima. I didn't think I was doing so hot myself. I wasn't 
getting on so well, but when we came around to the question period, 
some man way back in the audience said, "Doctor, you have been 
talking about Iwo Jima; would you mind discoursing for a minute 
on what you think of the tactics of small landing parties as they 
were employed at Iwo." I said, "I don't know a thing in God's world 
about it." I saw my audience was very much relieved from that 
minute. If you don't know, say so and try to find out. 
Know your stuff. Now that means a lot in the way of the 
utilization of your time. And it means a lot in the way of utilization 
of a Navy wife or an Army wife. You boys think you have 
a hard life to lead. You don't have any tougher life to 
5 
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lead than the life of a Navy wife. And both the Navy hus­
band and the Navy wife need to learn all they can, when they can. 
I'd like to give you a little motto on that question. I gave it to one 
of my historical secretaries. She happens to be the one who came 
up with me this morning. She said it was the most useful thing 
I'd ever told her. It came from Oliver Wendell Holmes, a Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States, who should have been 
Chief Justice. Holmes would get a boy from Harvard Law School 
every year, and that boy would have one year as Holmes' law 
clerk, a magnificent training, out of which in their generation have 
come some of the best lawyers in public service in America. And 
one of the favorite things that he would tell these boys was, 
"Young man, make the most of the scraps of time." Now, believe 
me, if you want to know your stuff and know it better than the 
other man, you've got to spend more time on it, and if you are 
going to spend more time on it you've got to make the most of the 
scraps of time. The difference between mediocrity and distinction 
in many a professional career is the organization of your time. Do 
you organize it, do you make the most of the scraps of time? 
Bless my soul, I don't suppose that the Admiral with his dignity 
and justice and regard for all the amenities says "no" to you about 
playing bridge, but there is many a man who would have three 
more stripes on his sleeve if he gave to study the time that he gives 
to bridge. Don't say that you have to have the recreation. You have 
to have enough recreation, but diversification of work fa the surest 
recreation of the mind. You don't have to go and forget the whole 
world. You have to work different brain centers and that is all you 
need to do. If you do it you get the recreation and out of the recrea­
tion you will get the training. Write it down, my young seamen, my 
young mariners (I love the word "mariner")-write it down, "Make 
the most of the scraps of time." 
If we have another war, which Almighty God forbid, and I 
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know not one single leader in the armed services who does not
say Amen to that-if we have another war it is going to be a 
highly technical war, but the older principles of leadership will stand. 
Number one will remain-know your stuff.
I have not a record of a single American soldier, a single 
American admiral who, when all was said and done, was not pro­
ficient in the knowledge of his specialty. Don't think the time spent 
at schools is lost either. Professional training for war is a cate­
gorical imperative of efficiency. In history I believe I knew General 
Lee's Brigadier, Major, and Lieutenant Generals pretty well. I think 
I have written about most of them, however poorly. Of all that com­
pany there were only two who became distinguished division com­
manders who had not had professional training. 
This idea of the inspiration of the soldier is nonsense. The 
idea that out of the great body of our people, you are going to get 
soldiers of high emminence-there is absolutely nothing to it. If you 
require professional training to save the lives of men in peace, 
and you call the man who does it a physician-are you not likewise 
called upon to have professional traininl{ for war in order to save the 
lives of men in war? And that man you call an Admiral or you call 
him a General. Professional training is worthwhile. The best 
money that ever was spent on the Navy of this country has been 
the money that was spent here at Newport. I don't believe any 
man can contradict that. 
Know your stuff-and be a man. That is number two. Be 
a man. We have had some leaders in American history who may 
not have been all they ought to have been in their regard for some of 
the amenities of life, but I never· knew a great American seaman, 
I never knew a great American soldier, or read about one, who was 
not fundamentally a man. And that means a man of character; it 
means a man of industry; it means a man of fair play. We were 
7 
11
Naval War College: September 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
talking at the house of the President of this College a little while ago 
about the matter of courage. And the Admiral said to me, "Doctor, 
have you ever found in history any process by which you can tell 
whether a man is going to show courage in action?" I said, "No, you 
never can; I don't believe you ever will. If we do, it will be thousands 
of years hence and by that time, please God, we may have sense 
enough not to fight wars." But this is a fact-the type of courage 
that keeps a man from turning his back on his adversaries and 
running away is one thing. That is not so uncommon. But the type 
of courage that is shown by a leader who will take his part of the 
load in all circumstances-that's a much rarer type of courage. 
What is the coward? Who is the coward in the high rank? 
He is not apt to be a physical craven but he is a man who some­
times tries to pass on to the other fellow the more difficult job and 
won't do his own. You take that great Captain of the state from 
which I have the honor of coming. You can see beautiful stories of 
the physical courage of General Robert E Lee. I never go to Wash­
ington from Richmond on Highway No. 1 that I don't see the 
house where he was standing one day on the porch, with a glass 
of buttermilk between the table and his mouth, when a round shot 
came within four feet of him and shattered the lintel of the door. 
You can see the place there today, and it was said that no man ob­
served a quiver when the glass went to his mouth. I have read the 
story of how he conducted himself on that bloody field of Spotsyl,­
vania Courthouse. That is fine, but if you want to see what courage 
is, what the real test of the man is, you read Lee's farewell to 
Jackson on the 2nd of May 1863. When Jackson, called upon to 
make the great turning movement there at Chancellorsville, was 
asked by General Lee, "What troops do you propose to make this 
movement with?" Jackson said, "My whole corps, sir." Lee then had 
about fifty thousand men. Jackson wanted to take twenty-eight 
thousand of them, put them in motion around the flank and leave 
8 
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Lee twenty-two thousand men with which to face the Federals while 
Jackson was out of action and making that movement around the 
flank. Lee could have said, "Why those are impossible figures. Take 
fourteen thousand men, and leave me enough at least with which to 
defend this line against these seventy-five thousand Federals here in 
the wilderness." Not so. Lee knew what concentration of force 
meant; Lee knew the doctrine of superiority of force at the point of 
contact. Lee had the courage to take his chance in order that his 
comrade might have superiority of force for difficult offensive op­
erations. In that, gentlemen-and it is repeated gloriously a hun­
dred times in American history-in that you see what I mean by the 
word courage. What I mean by the words: be a man.
Aye. Be a man who is disciplined in spirit. Be a man who is 
observant. How many fine persons there are who go through this 
world. Never forget and, as God gives me might, I shall never fail 
on a lecture to mention Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox-Cadmus Marcel­
lus Wilcox and his observation of a string over the shoulder of the 
Federals in that same battle of Chancellorsville. Remember Cadmus 
Marcellus Wilcox? What a name. Cadmus had his orders, "You move 
when the Federals do. You've got one' little brigade here; you a1·e 
holding Banks Ford and when they move, you move." Cadmus went 
out the next morning early. (Every good seaman ought to be out 
early. People talk about what you ought to do for the redemption of 
the American people. The American people need nothing in this 
world more than they need to get up earlier and to go to bed 
earlier.) Cadmus Marcellus got up earlier than most men, and he 
went out and looked, which a great many people never do, and over 
Banks Ford he saw that Federal sentinel walking his post, and an­
other and another down the line, in plain view. Well there is nothing 
uncommon about a sentinel walking his post is there? But Mar­
cellus wasn't content with that; Marcellus took his glasses and he 
looked at that sentinel who may have been thinking about anything 
9 
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under the sun other than his military duties; and Marcellus observed 
that over that sentinel's shoulder there was a string, and behind 
that sentinel's left hip as he looked at the end of the string was his 
haversack. And Marcellus looked at the next sentinel and he had on 
his haversack and the next and the next and Marcellus said to him­
self, "Those birds are getting ready to move because if they were 
simply in camp they wouldn't have on their haversacks and their 
haversacks wouldn't be full. They have got their rations on them 
because they are getting ready to move." He ordered his artillery 
hitched, got his infantry in position and within fifteen minutes after 
those Federals started their withdrawal, Marcellus was in the road 
and he hadn't gone three miles before he had the great opportunity 
of his career to stop a Federal offensive. 
Observation! Be a man, not a blind man. Might as well 
go down in the engine room and stay there if you are not going to 
look and see. 
Last of all, the third point. Look after your men. Look after 
your men. What a simple thing you are saying, Rip Van Winkle! 
Here you have three-fourths of the brass and nine-tenths of the 
brains of the American Navy before you and you are saying that 
leadership is three things and you have listed those things so 
simply. Know your stuff-be a man-and look after your men. We 
came a long way to hear you Rip Van Winkle and is that all you 
have to say? Yes! That is all, because that is the sum observation of 
my travels. Look after your men. 
I mention to you the fact that as a youth I saw those gray 
columns moving up the street and I heard the clatter of cavalry 
forty years after. I saw those men who had thrust through the 
wilderness, those men who had stood at Second Manassas, and 
those who had climbed the hill at Gettysburg and had their red 
10 
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banners with them until twenty.:.two of. those flags were there on 
one acre in the Federal position. I saw them; I knew many of them, 
and often I asked them, "Tell me, that great man who is our southern 
demagogue, this Lee, what was there about him that made you 
reverence him? What was there in him that made you tell us that 
next to the love of God and His Son, there had to be reverence 
for him?" An incredibly simple answer, my friends, they gave me. 
"Oh," they said, over and over again, "he looked after his men! 
We knew that when he demanded anything of us, it was be­
cause he had to. And when he said, 'Men, you must take that 
height', we took it, because we knew that was the cheapest thing to 
do." He looked after his men. So did the Lieutenants-some of 
the men to you unknown. Did you ever hear of the name of 
John R. Cooke? Some of you did; just a Brigadier General in the 
Confederate Army. I remember him well, an old man running a 
grocery store, an unprosperous grocery store. He had in his head the 
- most beautiful bullet hole you ever saw in your life. He must
have been hard-headed-it never crackeq his skull. One day when
he was in his thirties he was commanding two little regiments
at Sharpsburg. On his left early in the morning something had
happened. Something had gone wrong even with Stonewall Jack­
son, and the . flank had been swept back. The Federals were at
the Dunker Church, and Hood's great Texans, the Grenadier Guard
:>f the Confederacy were panting in the woods. The tide swept
around to the center on that segmented battlefield. There an im­
pression was made, not too deep. Cooke stood there, a little salient
-two regiments ; and against his fire, with the supporting artillery
around the Dunker Church a Federal corps broke · itself in vain.
During the fight Longstreet sent word to him and asked him if
he wanted help, and I am told that of all the classic cussing that
ever has been heard in the American Army�and the American
Army sometimes casts reflections on its adversary's ancestry back
six or eight generations-there never had been heard such words as
11 
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those that Cooke sent back. "Give him help! Not until every man he 
had was pursuing through hell the last Yankee in front of him!" 
Or words to that effect. I said to myself, "What is in that man? 
What made that Twenty-seventh North Carolina regiment that 
way? This Third Arkansas-Arkansas is a good state, good fight­
ers. They have some mighty long-winded politicians among them, 
but what made that Third Arkansas regiment do that?" And I 
took the pains to go back and I found that from the very time 
that Cooke had taken over that regiment (he had been a captain 
in the regular army before the war) he had done everything he 
could to tell those men, "I am going to p.emand the maximum of 
you and I am going to do the maximum for you." He held them 
to the highest standards and he did for them everything that a 
man could to protect them from casualties. 
Look after your men-it means many things; it means 
many things that you don't think about. It means mail facilities; 
it means food. General Lee, no matter how much impoverished 
his commissariat was, never failed to increase his men's rations 
after they had won a fight. Hot food is one of the greatest 
builders of morale in the history of war. Looking after your men 
means looking after their clothes. I was telling one of the of­
ficers today how much emphasis George Washington laid on the 
cleanliness of person. That great builder of morale, that same 
Lee, when he got his men out of a dirty campaign always 
tried to put them by a stream where they could wash. And the 
most valiant men were the men who, if they needed it, got the 
new uniforms. Look after your men and your men will look after 
you. I don't believe there has ever been an exception to that 
dictum. 
I said one day to MacArthur, "You know, I think when 
I come to write the history of your campaign, there from the 
12 
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Solomons northward, one of the things I am going to find the 
most difficult to understand is how you did so much with so 
little." Well he lighted his corn-cob pipe for the four hundred and 
fifty-third time that afternoon, and made the seventeenth oration 
that he had delivered to me that day, and he said many things 
that were absolutely true and sound. And we talked about his 
casualties, about how few there were in terms of what was done. 
I said, "Difficult as it was, you looked after your men." And I 
quoted him some of the things I told you. He said, "Well if there 
was economy of life, it is something for which"-and he dropped 
all bis theatric�! manner-"something for which I will be grate­
ful to the end of my days." He said, "When I thought about the 
number who were killed, nothing could console me except the 
thought that maybe by God's grace and hard effort we had saved 
some that might otherwise have been slain." He is a tall man; be 
got up and walked the floor as he sometimes did when he spoke, 
but believe, me be grew taller and taller in my eyes as he spoke
• those words.
.. 
Gentlemen, have I over-simplified this case? I think some­
times we over-complicate it. I think sometimes we take these boo\s 
on psychology, we take all the arts of salesmenship and we try 
to apply them to the armed services in a manner that is too 
elaborate. I don't believe I'm over-simplifying when I say to you, 
know your stuff, be a man, look after your men. 
Remember you may in God's mercy have had your day of 
battle. You who were there in the Arctic night-you who flew across 
the hump-you who went from South America to Africa-you who 
fought those submarines up and down our coast-you who went 
out from Pearl Harbor never knowing whether that submarine 
would come back again or whether your burial place ever would be 
known to men-you who were in the supply service-you who 
13 
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were in the battlefield-you who had the immortal honor of serv­
ing with Spruance, with Kinkaid, with Halsey-you may have 
had your day, you may live until over it all comes the glamour 
of the years and you may tell the tale so often that y��•ll hardly 
be able to distinguish the fabric from the embroidery. Such things 
happen. On the other hand your challenge may lie ahead-the era 
of atomic warfare may bring us problems vaster than anybody 
ever faced before. 
I covet but one thing for you and that is, if you �me to 
the final day which must for America always be the day of vic­
tory, I covet for you nothing more than that in the day of victory 
you can say with a clear conscience what was said by the van­
quished as he rode back through those thin gray ranks across 
the red hills of Appomattox one day in April 1865. The men 
knew that something had happened because he had been in the 
midst of the Federal lines. They broke ranks, they thronged 
the road, they gathered around him, they put up their hands. 
"General !" they said, "General ! Are we surrendered? General! 
Give us another chance, we'll fight them now." He said "No, my 
men. I've done for you the best I knew how to do." Your nation 
demands of you no less than that; your conscience should ask no 
more than that you do the best. 
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TURKEY 
A lecture delivered by 
Professor Walter L. Wright, Jr. 
at the Naval War College 
February 23, 1949 
Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure to have the person who in­
troduces you as a lecturer not only state the text on which you 
are to speak but also the conclusion at which you are going to ar­
rive. This is not entirely astonishing to me because I am aware 
that the Straits of the Bosporous and the Dardanelles have been 
househO'ld words in the Navy Department ever since 1800, when 
Admiral Bainbridge very unwillingly sailed the Washington up 
through those straits and passed the batteries on the Dardanelles. 
To carry you back for a moment to the days of sail (which 
I understand is not always unwelcome to sailors), Bainbridge was 
ordered by the Dey of Algiers to take a special emissary to his 
overlord, the Sultan of Turkey. The Dey threatened to blow the 
Washington out of the sea with his shore batteries if Bainbridge 
refused. He therefore started under duress flying the Algerian 
flag, but as soon as he got out of range of the batteries he 
sent a sailor up the mast and took the flag down, and there­
after he sailed under the Stars and Stripes. When he got to the 
entrance of the Dardanelles, where there were great forts on 
either side, he knew that a strange and unknown flag would be 
fired upon. He wasn't going to strike the American flag so he 
had to find a solution. The solution was this: he headed straight 
in toward the anchorage near one of these forts, and as he 
The late Professor Wright spent many years in the Near East 
as an instructor in the American University of Beirut, Syria, and as 
President of the American College for Girls and Robert College, both 
in Istanbul, Turkey. 
The Naval War College takes this opportunity of expressing its 
deep regret at the death of Professor Wrizht. May 16th. 1949. 
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went in he began furling sail and firing a salute. Of course the 
salute was fired with black powder and there was plenty of smoke. 
As soon as he had a good smoke screen in the air, he began un­
furling sail, and the first thing the Turkish artillerymen on shore 
knew, the Washington under full sail was emerging from her 
cloud of smoke, already out of range of their guns, which were 
in fixed emplacements and couldn't be shifted as the ship moved. 
So, to American sailors, these are familiar waters-the Darda­
nelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosporous. You don't need, 
therefore, to be told a great deal about the general strategic 
importance of Turkey, which is the possessor of these narrow 
seas, these straits leading from the Black Sea into the Aegean. 
There has been a good deal of talk since 1939 to the ef­
fect that these straits have lost their importance; that the range 
of air bombardment is such that the Aegean Sea in itself is a suf­
ficiently narrow area to make the use of naval forces in any great 
number impossible, and there is, of course, a good deal of truth in 
this statement. Certainly the Aegean Sea, which is nowhere more 
than two hundred miles wide, offers very little opportunity for 
maneuver when you can get an air force out there any hour of the 
day. On the other hand, the crucial point within this narrow area 
has simply been lengthened by the addition of air force and the pos­
sibility of air attack. The tightest point in the long narrow passage 
is still the straits leading from the Black Sea to the Marmara and 
into the Aegean. 
I suppose that it's appropriate to mention one major 
strategic point which I will refer to later. From the point of view 
of those who are most concerned with the straits, their major im­
portance formerly was that behind the straits lay a body of water 
large enough for the training of a massive fleet, which might, if 
the straits were opened to it, emerge fully prepared for battle in 
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the Mediterranean or even in the Atlantic. That was the basic 
consideration, undoubtedly, in British naval thinking in the nine­
teenth century. I think it's still true. It's still true, but it is also 
true that, in 'order to have this facility, a power which might build 
such a fleet (which might be at the present time the Soviet Union) 
would have to possess far more territory than merely the straits 
themselves. It would be necessary for that power to possess at least 
the coasts of Asiatic Turkey, because only in that way could it 
provide the necessary air cover for its ships going from the Aegean 
to the Eastern Mediterranean. Some of these points will come up 
again later so I shall not unduly stress them at the present moment. 
·' .
The country, Turkey, with which I'tn dealing this morning 
is by present day count a small country. It has approximately the 
same area as the two American states of California and Montana. 
The area is about two hundred and ninety four thousand square 
miles, and those two states are a little bit larger than that. It has 
very much the same topography. If you look at the map, you'll 
realize that all of the coast of Turkey is mountainous, that the en­
tire peninsula is surrounded by a wall of mountains, and on the 
seaward side of those mountains there are a certain number of 
plains, for the most part small plains, and in many cases very bad­
ly connected with the interior of the country. Only one of the 
major sea-c�asts of Turkey has any good ports in it. On the en­
tire northern coast, on the Black Sea, there is not one single port 
which could accommodate a naval vessel of any importance what­
soever. There is a great dearth even of beaches which could be 
19 used for beach landings. The northern coastal range of mountains 
starting with Mount Olympus, which rises to a height of eighty four 
hundred feet, continues to rise in height all the way along, up to the 
Caucasus peaks, thirteen to fourteen thousand feet high. Of course 
the final high point of the country is Mt. Ararat which is ap­
proximately seventeen thousand feet in height. 
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From Istanbul, in the Bosphorus, down to the southwestern
corner of the peninsula you have a great succession of very fine
natural ports. There is only one developed port (and when I say 
developed, I use the word with reservation) and that is the partial­
ly developed port of Izmir, formerly called Smyrna. 
On the southern coast again you have a mountain range 
running right along the shore, and no developed ports whatever un­
til you get down to Alexandretta (which the Turks call Iskender'." 
un) in the extreme south corner-the southern extension of 
Turkey.· 
Now you realize from looking at the map that the mass of 
the population is in the Aegean river valleys which are very fertile. 
This is the region of Smyrna figs and Smyrna raisins. There is also a 
. thick population along the Black Sea coast, in spite of the fact that 
there is only a small amount of arable ground. That is because this 
region is the only region in Turkey which has a very heavy rain­
fall. In the extreme eastern part of the Black Sea coast you have a 
rainfall such as you have in Sitka, Alaska-extremely heavy rain­
fall with rain practically every day. 
The communcations from the coasts to the interior of Turkey 
are, by modern reckoning, very poor at every point, but the best 
communications that .do exist are rail communicatons and we have 
these running in from the port of Alexandretta, then through the 
Cilician plain and through the great Taurus mountain range up 
into the central plateau. Between Mersin on the Cilician coast and 
Smyrna there is no railway reaching the sea. Between Smyrna and 
Istanbul, there is no other railway connecting a port with the in­
terior. Along the Black Sea coast there are two railways running 
from the coast inland. One starts at Zonguldak, which is the area 
in which Turkish .coal is produced. Here is a very sizeable coal 
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field, with a very adequate quality of bituminous coal. The rail­
way runs from there up to the capital of the country, high on the 
interior plateau at Ankara. A second railway starting from Sam­
sun, the great tobacco port on the Black Sea, connects with the 
internal system of railways which form a sort of very loose net 
around practically the whole country. 
You realize, then, that this peninsula, surrounded by 
mountains on every side, with narrow coastal plains, with few 
communications with the interior, with very few ports of any con­
sequence, is not what you would call exactly an attractive place on 
which one could1and forces in the face of opposition. Nevertheless, 
unattractive as it is, it's an area which must be studied. It must 
be studied, basically because of the position which it occupies in 
the world. Turkey is a finger pointing westward. It lies at the 
point where Asia and Europe meet; it lies surrounded by seas; 
it has as central a location in the geography of the world as any 
country you could mention. It's not marginal, it isn't merely on 
the edge of the Asiatic continent. It is the link which joins the 
Asiatic continent to Europe which is, itself, nothing more than 
a peninsula of the vast mass of Asia. 
You know your maps, I'm sure, as well as I, so it's hardly 
appropriate for me to enlarge too much on this fact. But I think 
it's well to call your attention to the increase in the importance 
of this territory as a result of modern developments in warfare. As 
I pictured it to you, it is obviously a sort of a natural fortress. Not 
only is it surrounded by mountains, but it is large enough to have 
within that wall of mountains plenty of room for the building of 
airfields-for the servicing of armies. In other words, it is a big 
enough fortress to serve as a base of operations in any direction­
and the directions which are attractive are very obvious. 
Let me look at it first of all from the Kremlin; it is very 
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obvious that one of the most important things we have to do is use 
our imagination and put ourselves in the position of the people 
with whom we may have violent disagreements. From the point 
of view of the Kremlin, here is this potentially great fortress, 
lying about two hundred miles from Russian territory across the 
Black Sea. Not just any Russan territory, but the industrial heart 
of Russia, built around the Donets coal basin. That two to three 
hundred miles is no distance at all from the point of view of mod­
ern bombing, as you are very well aware. Not only is that a very 
vulnerable part of Russia which would be in danger of attack if 
Turkey were in unfriendly hands, but, no further away from 
Turkish territory and on the western shore of the Caspian Sea 
is the greatest of the existing Russian oil fields, the great Baku. oil 
field. It isn't producing what it did a few years ago, but, so far 
as we know, it is still the major producing oil field of Russia. These 
are very vital objectives, and I think it is very apparent, there­
fore, why the Soviet Union is anxious to make sure that Turkey 
is not being used as the base for an attack, nor in a position to be 
used as a base for an attack, on the Soviet Union. And, pushing 
that just a little bit further, it is also clear why it would be a. 
great advantage to Russia if Turkey were in Russia's possession, 
a satellite state, or under Russian domination. Because, just 
as bombing planes could operate from Turkish territory, just as 
navies could operate through the straits into the Black Sea (as they 
did in the Crimean War-the one case in modern times in which 
Russia was successfully invaded)-by the same token, this fort­
ress, being just as defensible from the south and east as it is from 
the north and west, could be the base for large scale air, land, 
and sea operations. 
It's a bit farther from Turkey to the Persian Gulf and its 
great reservoir of oil (at least 40% of the world's known oil sup­
ply is in that area) but it's not beyond effective bombing range 
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of Turkish territory. The Mosul oil field is practically in sight of 
the Turkish frontier (I must say, within sight of a highly mount­
ainous area with very little land on which airfields could be built, 
but nevertheless within easy range of other areas from which air 
attacks might be mounted). 
The possession, then, of this territory by either of two op� 
posing world powers (the Soviet Union or the United States) 
would be a peril to the other. And I think it's only fair to follow 
our imagination a little further and say that the policies of the 
United States with respect to Turkey must be governed to a con­
siderable degree by the foreseeable reactions to this or that move 
which we can expect the RussiaI).s to have. Consequently you 
are brought to this conclusion: if the United States embarked on 
a policy of the kind of imperialism which we called "old fashioned," 
and undertook, through annoyance with the inefficiency of the 
native inhabitants or for some other reason, to take over and op­
erate Turkey, all Russian statesmen and strategists would have 
a completely legitimate feeling that we were threatening their se­
curity. Therefore, it is obviously appropriate that we should make 
every effort, while maintaining our security in this area, not to 
push our policy to the point where the Soviet planners and strate­
gists would have legitimate grounds to feel that we were aiming 
a dagger at their heart (an expression which they would no doubt 
come to use). 
I'm happy to say that, up to the present time, the policy 
which the United States has followed with respect to Turkey has 
been along the lines which I have just explained. The policy of 
the United States has been to form what is, in effect, an informal 
alliance with Turkey. It is an alliance which doesn't require that we 
send military forces to this or that point, under this or that contin­
gency, but an alliance in the sense that we are confident of Turkey's 
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being on our side in any dispute between ourselves and the Soviet 
Union. Therefore it is to our interest to have this small country in a 
position to defend itself against attack which might come from the 
Soviet Union. Consequently, the couple of hundred million dollars of 
aid to Turkey which the United States is paying, is being used to 
build up the defensive strength of the Turkish Republic. Some 
of it is being used for longer range, and some for shorter range 
purposes. 
One of the most long range is the appropriation which is 
being spent on the improvement of Turkish road communications 
and transportation. There, our representatives have been able to 
persuade the Turkish government to spend the ten million dollars 
appropriated almost entirely for road making machinery; whereas 
the Turkish government itself, from its own local resources, is pro­
viding the labor and the material necessary for the construction 
of a system of highways. This program will not make Turkey a 
country like Rhode Island or Connecticut from the point of view 
of roads, but will represent several hundred percent improvement 
in the existing situation. 
So our relations with Turkey amount, at the present time, to 
an informal alliance. Now, if Turkey is an ally, it's very fair to ask, 
"What kind of an ally?" I'll give you an example of what I mean. 
In 1914, Russia had an ally in Serbia, and the adventurous policy 
which was followed by the Serbian government led to a world war 
in which the Russian empire was destroyed. We, in our relations 
with Turkey, are in a somewhat similar position: here is a small 
nation which is our ally; what kind of an ally? If that ally follows 
an adventurous policy, the first thing we know we are going to find 
ourselves involved in its quarrels with its neighbors-quarrels 
which may not be of any particular int.erest to us, just as it was 
of no immediate importance to the Russian government in 1914 
to have the Archduke of Austria assassinated in Sarajevo. 
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I'm merely bringing this out to show you how dangerous the 
small ally can be to the greater ally. As far as Turkey is concerned, 
the most important fact in this connection is that the men who are 
ruling Turkey at the present time are ruling that small country 
with the wisdom which they acquired in the process of losing a 
large empire. The statesmen of Turkey are not peasants; they 
are not newcomers on the scene of international politics; they, as 
they would put it themselves, are "well cooked". They know their 
business: they know what works in international politics; and they 
know what doesn't work. They are very well aware that the worst 
thing they could do, granted the informal nature of their alliance 
with the United States, would be to stir up unnecessary friction 
with their neighbors {particularly with the Soviet Union). In our 
own country, with our foreign policy dependent upon public opin­
ion-not just on the decisions of a few people in positions of high 
command-we might be faced by the question "Will we save this 
small ally from its own mistakes; will we go to war in a cause for 
which we have very little sympathy?" Well, you and I know what 
the answer would be. Under those circumstances, the United 
States wouldn't go to war; the American people are not that kind of 
warmongers. They've been accused of it from the other side of the 
Atlantic and the Urals, but they are not that kind of war makers. 
Fortunately the men who are operating the Turkish. state are fully 
aware of this, and they are determined to follow a policy with 
respect to their greater and smaller neighbors which is one hun­
dred percent "correct" in the diplomatic sense. They are not going 
to start any unnecessary rows. 
What are the aims and policies, the resources and population 
of the Turks? They believe, rightly or wrongly, that they have a 
country capable of supporting a much larger population than is at 
present in Turkey, and at a much higher standard of living than 
they now enjoy. They want peace for survival, peace for develop-
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ment of their resources. I've used the word development, and I 
think it should be defined a little more closely. What kind of de­
velopment, what kind of ideals, do these people have before them, 
of the society into which they want to develop? What kind of 
nation do they want to be? A decision was reached by them 
twenty-five years ago. At that time they chose between the so­
'Ciety sponsored by Russia and the sort of society which Western 
Europe and the United States represented. During the interven­
ing years they have consistently maintained the same point of 
view. What they want, as a people, is to become a nation like the 
highly developed nations of Western Europe or like the United 
States. They have no territorial ambitions at the present time. 
They don't want to take any land from their neighbors. They want 
to live, to survive in peace, to develop their resources, to work out 
the many problems with which they are faced internally and be­
come a nation as much like this country as they are able to become. 
We are, to a certain extent, responsible for their having 
this point of view. I hope that, since I was president of the Ameri­
can colleges in Turkey, I may be allowed to do a little advertising 
for a moment. The existence of American schools and colleges, 
paid for by Americans (first by missionary-minded Americans and 
later by the simple humanitarian type of benefactor and philan­
thropist) has had a good deal to do with persuading the Turkish 
people that they want to live the way Americans and British and 
Western Europeans live. 
Well, I've spoken again and again of the people. There are 
about eighteen million people living in Turkey, and all of them 
haven't been Turks. They have at present in their country, a num­
ber of minorities. The one which is large enough to be significant, 
amounting to a million and a half people out of the eighteen mil­
lion, is the Kurdish minority. The Kurd tribesmen speak a language 
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related to Persian. Each tribe has been an independent nation 
ever since the beginning of history. They live in the territory 
extending from a point near Alexandretta out to the Russian 
frontier. They comprise about one million and a half people, living 
mostly in the mountains. No previous Turkish government, in fact 
no government of any kind, had ever subdued these people. Their 
mountains were so rugged, and so high, and so miserably poor, 
that it wasn't worth the investment in money and lives necessary 
to subdue these people. The Turkish Republic, however, has sub­
dued them, that is, all of those who live within Turkey . There are 
considerable groups, half a million or more, living in Iran and Iraq. 
But those living in Turkey are completely subjected at the present 
time. They are not only subjected, but the Turks, with that wis­
dom which they learned from losing an empire, having subdued 
them in the military sense, having occupied every valley and every 
hamlet in the whole country with considerable cost of life, then 
said to the Kurds, "Now you are licked, you are Turks." It is the 
same policy, in general, which the British government followed 
in dealing with the Boers in South Africa, but proving in Turkey 
much more effective tha:11 any one had thought possible. 
I travelled through that entire country last summer; talked 
with hundreds of people in the region, and I came away with the 
impression that the one big minority problem of Turkey is licked 
and that within a few years there won't be any people in Turkey 
who consider themselves Kurds. The young men are all going 
into the military service and they like it. They come back proud 
of their service ribbons. They come back with the title of Sergeant, 
which they wear throughout life. They tell the people in the 
mountain villages in which the governments have forced them to 
settle, "We are smarter than the Turks are; we should all go out 
into Western Turkey and make our fortunes and then come back 
here and live happily." They have come to think of themselves 
as members of the Turkish community. 
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There are other minorities; one consists of Greek-speaking
people, about one hundred thousand, all of whom live near or in 
the city of Istanbul or Constantinople. An Armenian-speaking
minority live in the same area, and the eighty thousand or more 
Jews in the country are scattered through a few of the larger 
- cities. The Greeks, who are not noted for their love of Turks,
nevertheless regard conditions in Turkey today (and quite right­
ly so) as much superior to conditions in Greece at the present
moment. They are not making any effort to leave, or making any
trouble in Turkey.
The Armenians are in an extremely difficult position. They 
are not regarded as first-class citizens (any more than the Greeks 
or Jews are) in this Moslem country, but there is not much they 
can do about it, so they are adjusting themselves to a position 
somewhat like that which the Negroes occupy in the United 
States. A good many Armenians were encouraged by the Soviet 
government to leave Turkey, to leave Syria, even . the United 
States, and go to the Soviet Republic of Armenia. I was up 
there in that region last summer (I don't mean on the Russian 
side of it but on the Turkish side) and I saw what was happening. 
A good many of these Armenians who have gone there as settlers 
in the Soviet-Armenian republic, flee from that country; they flee 
to Turkey for safety and security. If any of you know of the re..; 
lations between Turks and Armenians, you'll realize that the 
last place you would expect an Armenian to go, seeking security, 
is Turkey. That, perhaps, will give you some idea of how terrible 
conditions are within Soviet-Armenia. 
I'll take a moment to tell you what these people say­
these refugees. They say that on arrival at Batumi, on the Black 
Sea coast, they are immediately sent to labor camps. The younger 
children are separated and are sent to special schools; families are 
broken up. The older people, whom the Soviet-Communists don't 
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expect to be able to convert to whole-hearted Communism, are sent 
to labor camps where they get a full ration only if they do a full 
days work (and a full ration consists of bread and cabbage soup). 
In the various shifts around the country, all their goods were 
stolen from them. Several boasted, when they came into Turkey, 
that they were wearing suits which they had stolen from the 
Russian guards. Those who can do a good day's work get a full 
ration; those who can't, get a half ration, and they die of starva­
tion before long. A good many, who have enough ambition and 
energy left, try to escape, and they escape into Turkey. When they 
come to the frontier they find in most places a barbed wire fence 
to hold them in, and sentry boxes one hundred to one hundred and 
fifty meters apart with sentries who shoot anyone crossing the 
frontier. But, as is usually the case in these authoritarian regimes, 
the authorities can't trust their subordinates. And so another 
organization, other than the sentries, rakes the soil between these 
sentry posts every morning; rakes it so that it's smooth; then if 
they find any foot prints there, they shoot the sentries. Now 
the refugees who do get out, get out through that as well as all the 
other controls inside the country. That gives you some idea of 
what conditions must be like behind the frontier for these im­
migrants. 
I've spoken of the minority populations in Turkey. What 
about the politics of Turkey? Now politics is the business of power 
internally, within the country. What is the situation? Up until 
two and one half years ago, Turkey was ruled by one party, a 
monolithic party. It was ruled this way: the President of the Re­
public was also President of the Party. As President of the Party, 
he chose all the party's candidates for parliament. The members 
of parliament, whom he had chosen, elected him President. That's 
what you might call a complete circle; perhaps not a vicious one, 
but nevertheless it's a complete circle. It was hard to distinguish 
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. between the Ministry of the Interior, which controls the police, 
and the officials of the party. The local governor in a province 
was appointed by the central government in Istanbul, not elected. 
Usually the local governor was also head of the local party or­
ganization. 
Two and one half years ago, Turkey was not as yet an in­
formal ally of the United States. Turkey had the idea of becom­
ing a Western country-Western in politics as well as in economy 
and society. But the people who were in charge of the government 
were not in a hurry to make any moves which would result in the 
loss of their jobs. They realized the status of General Franco in 
his relations with the United States, and of a few other countries 
with which alliance could not be contracted by the United States 
government because of the bad press which they enjoyed as a result 
of their having a fascist or semi-fascist type of regime. When the 
President of Turkey and his advisers realized the situation, they 
decided to move, more rapidly than they had planned, in the direc­
tion of a genuine democratic system. And consequently you had 
the emergence of a new party, the second party. This had been 
tried a couple of times in the past, but the results had not been 
happy for the people who tried it. This time the new party was 
founded under the leadership of a former Prime Minister, with 
the obvious approval and consent of the President of the Repub­
lic. Shortly thereafter, there was a general election. In that 
election the new party won only'about sixty members of the parlia­
ment, whereas the old established party won over three hundred 
members. The opposition party claimed that the elections were 
finagled-that there was all kinds of skull-duggery practiced. 
From what I was able to discover in talking to a great many 
people last summer, in the big coastal cities, where there were 
plenty of foreign observers around, the elections were absolutely 
honest. As you went away from the coast, and left the foreign 
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observers behind, there was increasing government police pressure 
upon people to vote in favor of the party in power. Those of 
you who have cruised around South American waters are very · 
familiar with the type of proceding which I am hinting at. The 
government saw to it, in other words, that there wasn't too much 
open scuffle, but that it was a good sized majority-in fact a very, 
very effective majority indeed. 
This has been done partly because of the aims of the Turk­
ish government and people, partly because of their desire to have 
a good press in the United States, in order to make alliance with 
Turkey possible not only for American soldiers and sailors but for 
the American man in the street. And they are succeeding; the 
process is going on, and I suspect that if you had an election 
tomorrow the opposition party would perhaps not win the election, 
but it would win a vastly larger number of the parliamentary 
seats. In Turkish politics, there is no argument on foreign pol­
icy. The foreign policy of all parties is identical. It calls for co­
operation with the United States and the allies of the United 
States, and for maintenance against every threat against the in­
dependence of the country. · 
Perhaps I might say a word here as to the morale of the 
Turkish people. The best illustration I can think of came from 
the newspaper yesterday. One of the leading writers of Turkey 
turned communist, was prosecuted and, when he was indicted, he 
disappeared. He was tried in absentia and condemned to three or 
· four months in prison. (I might say that all known communists in
Turkey are lodged permanently at government expense, in prison.
There are very few of them; they are not a great burden to the
finances.) This man disappeared and nothing was heard of him
until the police caught a man who made it his business to spirit
people away from Turkey to Bulgaria and vice-versa. When they
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gave the usual third degree treatment to this gentleman, they dis­
covered that he had killed this prominent writer. His story was 
that the prominent writer had come to him, offered him money 
to be taken over into Bulgaria. The brigand didn't know who his 
customer was until he got very close to the frontier, and then he 
said, "I realized suddenly that this was the wicked communist 
writer. I may have had some faults in the past but no one can 
claim that I'm not a patriotic Turk. Under these circumstances 
. what could I do? I couldn't take this man to a foreign country, 
where he could safely attack the fatherland, so I killed him." 
Now if the brigands and thieves talk this way, it gives you some 
idea of the force, of the determination, of these people to main­
tain themselves as an independent nation. I might say it turned 
out later, after this gentleman had received some more third de­
gree, that the writer had exhibited a very large roll of paper money 
which may have had· something to do with the murder. 
I shall not go on further with this, but I'll ask you to be­
lieve that the vast majority of these people, close to one hundred 
percent, are united, completely united, in foreign policy. The dif­
ferences between the political parties �re domestic differences about 
the rate at which changes should take place, about the kind of 
reforms that should be adopted, and so on. 
Now let's tu:rn to this question, "What does Turkey expect 
of its relations with the United States?" First of all they ex-. 
pect to get supplies, and they are getting them. They ·have bought 
largely war surplus material and· they got it very cheap indeed, 
at least in the earlier shipments. They want arms for their Army 
and Navy. Their Army is always going to be more important to 
them than either their Navy or Air Force, because they do not 
have the technical facilities, they don't have the industry to sup­
port as complicated an instrument as either a navy or an air force, 
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They can!-t build ships, they can't build airplanes and they can't
even repair them because of their lack of technological development.
What they expect of us in navy and air force is minimum weapons; 
enough to put on a show. Of course the Navy men want bigger and 
better ships, and they are always asking for them, but they don't 
really expect to get anything bigger than a light cruiser. They know 
that they couldn't make any real use of anything except destroyers, 
submarines, gunboats and that sort of thing. 
In the event of war between Turkey and the Soviet Union, the 
Turks don't expect massive American forces to be sent to their aid. 
They believe that their Army, which is obviously their strongest and 
most numerous group, if supplied with weapons and ammunition, 
and if provided with a moderate amount of air cover, will be able 
to defend the heart of the country until the Russians are so busy 
elsewhere that they will be able to stabilize the situation to Turkey's 
advantage. 
So if a crisis should arise, the first thing that the Turks 
would expect of us would be air support. And it's quite obvious that 
the kind of air support that they would expect, first of all, would be 
the kind that could be delivered on carriers. Whether or not it's 
feasible to send carrier aircraft there to operate in the Black Sea 
or short of the Black. Sea, is a technical question which you gentle­
men can answer much better than I .. 
What-would we expect from this informal alliance which 
seems to exist? Turkey, as you see, wants to survive; that's the 
motive all the way through. What we want, it seems to me, is first 
of all to keep Turkey out of the hands of the Soviet Union. If Turkey 
were occupied and held by the Soviets, the entire Eastern Mediter, 
ranean would be shut off as far as we are concerned. It would per, 
mit att!lck, both by air and by land, against the great oil-bearjng 
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territories around the Persian Gulf and, although we could fight a
war without that oil, we don't have any allies in Europe who could 
fight a war without the oil of the Persian Gulf. Therefore, our 
first point is to keep Turkey within the area that we can do busi­
ness with and preclude the Russians' taking it over. 
More specific, what can we expect the Turks to do in a mili­
tary way? Again there are technical questions which you'll know 
better how to answer than I, but obviously it's going to take time; 
time is going to be an important factor. Can we so prepare the 
Turks that they could maintain themselves until such time as we 
could bring forces to the Persian Gulf area (which is the most vital 
of all these areas as far as I can see), so that we could bring forces 
there adequate to defend them even if the Turks were wiped out? 
That's a militarily important question, but evidentally we think 
there is some possibility, militarily, or else we wouldn't be engaged 
in sending arms to Turkey and in training Turkish officers and men 
for defense. 
Now another point, which I think is a very moot point but 
one which we should discuss and understand clearly. Although we 
have an arrangement with Greece, and an informal alliance with 
Turkey, we have no formal or informal arrangement with Iran. 
That leaves open the possibility that Iran might be used to outflank 
Turkey, and a Russian attack might pass down toward the Persian 
Gulf, first through Iran, and then Iraq to the Persian Gulf. If 
there were a strong Turkish Army to the West, capable of receiving 
extensive reenforcements, particularly in air power, I very much 
doubt that any Russian commanding officer would want to send 
forces down there within range of Turkish air fields. 
Again there is the question: "Would the Turks be prepared 
to let us use their airfields?" That too depends upon imponderable 
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factors-the development of relations between the Turks and their 
neighbors and between the Turks and ourselves. As matters are 
now moving, I think it is not probable, but very possible, that we 
would be in a position, through the arms which we have given to 
Turkey, to make that outflanking movement too risky for the 
Soviet to undertake. 
Well, what are the hopes, what are the fears of the moment? 
Obviously, from the Turkish point of view, the hope is that if they 
are involved in a war with Russia, the only nation they fear, it will 
be a war of a kind which will inevitably involve both Great Britain 
and the United States. As far as the United States is concerned, 
we hope that our arming of Turkey will deter the Russians from 
an attack, and that the contingency against which we are preparing 
will never arise. 
And finally, I think we have to face this question, "How 
long will the type of arrangements, which we now have, last? Is it 
just a short-term policy or is it a long-term policy?" Long term 
policies depend upon community of interests between nations ; not 
sentiments, but common interests. And, as I said earlier, our in­
terest is not to occupy and administer Turkey, but to make Turkey 
strong enough to occupy and administer herself and prevent any out­
side power from taking over. We want an independent nation that 
will add to our security in the Near East. It has to be Turkey, be­
cause it is from Turkey that the oil, which is essential to our having 
any effective allies, can be defended. So with this community of in­
terest which exists, namely, survival of the Turks as an independent 
nation (that interest being the same for them as for us) I think 
that there is every ptospect of a long duration to the present type of 
informal alliance. 
And I can say this as a final word. Last summer I talked 
with thousands of Turks, and with dozens of Americans, includ-
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ing the heads of the Naval and Army missions in Turkey, the Am­
bassadors and many of the Ministers of the Turkish Cabinet. 
Thus far our people, military and civilian, have been operating 
with a high degree of good sense and tact and understanding, 
pushing ahead with their work, obviously not interested in taking 
over Turkey as a conquered state. They have been doing all this 
with such success that there is not yet any serious cloud on the 
horizon as far as Turko-American relations are concerned. 
Turkey is important because of its position,, because of its 
morale, because of its point of view. It is important to the United 
States and the United States is important to Turkey. Our informal 
alliance is working and is working very well indeed, and I think we 
have every reason to be satisfied with the present state of affairs. 
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LIGHT WITHOUT HEAT 
An article by 
Lieut. Commander R. E. Williams (SC) USN 
The fact that modern warfare is everybody's business was 
distinctly underscored by the proceedings of the War College Round­
Table Discussions held during the first week of May, 1949. These 
conferences, conceived with a view to obtaining the very best in cur­
rent strategic thinking, were attended by outstanding men in civilian 
life and high ranking officers from all branches of the Armed 
Forces. 
To the officers of the Naval War College the discussions sum­
marized everything that had gone before in ten months' work on 
tactical problems, employment of forces, weapon capabilities, war 
potential, mobilization and grand strategy. To the civilian guests 
they represented an opportunity to participate in a stimulating ex­
change of ideas in an atmosphere of professional competence rather 
than one of amateur speculation. To everyone they offered the 
priceless advantage of access to all other participants, whether 
across the conference table, over a cup of coffee, or simply in the 
wardroom of the USS Kearsarge, aboard which many of the guests 
were billeted. 
The discussion groups, as finally constituted, included repre-
sentatives of four principal experience categories: 
(a) Staff and student officers of the Naval War College;
(b) Representatives of other Service Colleges;
(c) Outstanding Naval Reserves Officers on temporary active
duty;
Lieut.· Commander Williams is a member of the Naval War Col­
lege Staff. His article is an appraisal of the Round Table Discussions 
conducted by the War College during the week 4-11 May, 1949. 
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(d) Prominent authors and newspapermen, business and in-:­
dustrial leaders, and noted public servants.
From a body composed of such diverse elements, the Naval 
War College was justified in expecting a notable amount of worth­
while fact, opinion and conclusions which it did indeed receive in 
gospel measure. The wholehearted participation of the War Col­
lege guests was a particularly gratifying feature of these dis­
cussions. 
Organized into nineteen small discussion groups, each. a 
representative cross section of the guest list, and presided over by 
a War College student moderator, officers and civilians alike sat 
down together to examine the factors influencing the national 
strategy of the United States. In an atmosphere of complete aca­
demic freedom, without rivalry or rancour and in a spirit of dis­
passionate inquiry, they spent six days in friendly, constructive 
discussion of problems common to all of them as American citi­
zens: What are the fundamental issues involved in the struggle 
between countries separated by the "Iron Curtain"? What factors 
exert a major influence in determining the world situation? What 
are, or should be, our own national objectives? How do we attain 
them? What are the means-military, political, economic, ideo­
logical-at our disposal for attaining those objectives? 
Other questions, proceeding out of the answers to these or­
iginal ones, were carefully scrutinized. Each group appeared to 
absorb, almost without consciously realizing it, the philosophy 
stressed in the keynote address: "What we are seeking most 
earnestly is to demonstrate that it is possible for men of good will 
to sit down together regardless of the color of, or the lack of, a 
uniform." 
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Thus it was that each of the discussion groups proceeded 
through six days, examining our national objectives and the means, 
both military and otherwise, of obtaining them, and ending with a 
concept of the future strategy of the United States. It is perhaps 
inaccurate to state that any of the groups actually derived its own 
"concept". The exercise was essentially an individual one, and it 
is more nearly accurate to say that the participating members ar­
rived at their individual concepts, which generally agreed in prin­
ciple with the others, but differed in various particulars. This was 
to be expected, for the purpose of the Naval War College is not to 
determine national strategy. That is the duty of the planning 
staffs in Washington. The War College seeks to develop the think­
ers who will eventually do that kind of planning. 
It is worthwhile noting that if the individual concepts dif­
fered in the methods of our strategy they were solidly agreed on its 
philosophy; that by no possil;>le stretch of the imagination or con­
science �ould we bring ourselves to initiate an aggressive "pre­
ventive" war; that the rank and file of a Communist-dominated 
country, far from being the exponents of their government, are its 
principal victims; that our Armed Forces, if it is necessary to use 
them, must be employed as an instrument of liberation rather than 
annihilation; that our Military Establishment remains-for all its 
size and power-only a part of the forces at our command and 
therefore it must be regarded at all times as the tool of state policy, 
not its master. 
Out of the conferences came many valuable lessons and en­
lightening experiences, but perhaps more gratifying than anything 
else was the circumstance under which men from all over the 
country and of many stations and occupations could freely assemble, 
freely speak and write, could lay aside prejudices and differences 
and could demonstrate that all of them were first and above all else, 
American Citizens. 
41
Naval War College: September 1949 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
RESTRICTED 
RECOMMENDED READING 
For those officers wishing to pursue a course in professional 
reading, the Naval War College Reading List is published here­
with. The list contains books and articles in many varied fields 
totaling over 13,000 pages. Officers at the Naval War College are 
urged to read selectively from the many categories during their ten 
months' course for a total of 5,000 pages. 
GEOPOLITICS 
Most Of The World Linton 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. 
873 pp. 
Descriptions of the geography, natural resources, populations, 
and of political and other basic factors in most of the countries 
of the world. 
New Compass Of The World 
New York: Macmillan, 1948. 
375 pp. 
Weigert and 
Stefansson 
A symposium on world political geography which includes 
articles by many noted authors on the influence of geography 
on the course of history. 
The Geography Of Air Transport Van Zandt 
Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1944. 
64 pp. 
The first of three volumes dealing with problems of world air 
transport. This volume (Vol. 1) deals with the purely geo­
graphical aspects of air transport, evaluating the world's air 
routes as to economic, military and linear factors. 
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Foundations Of National Power 
(Selections) 
Sprout 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1945 
Readings on world politics and American security; speeches, 
papers, and essays from books by Lippman, Welles, Chamber­
lin and many others. 
Democ-ratic Ideals And Reality 
New York: Holt, 1919. 
Mackinder 
208 pp. 
This book, first published in 1919 and reissued unchanged in 
1942, deals with "Grand Strategy"-the integration of the 
military, political, economic, geographic, and psychological fac­
tors of national power. Emphasis is placed on the development 
of the "Heartland" theory and the conflict between land power 
and sea power. 
Geopolitics Strausz-Hupe 
New York: G. P. Putnam & Company, 1942. 
274 pp. 
This book traces with keen insight the trend of thought from 
Mahan and Mackinder through Homer Lea and Ratzel to 
Haushofer and the Munich Work-Group for Geopolitik. 
GEOGRAPHY 
The Medite"anean, Its Role In Reitzel 
America's Foreign Policy 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948 
185 pp. 
A study of foreign relations and power politics in the Mediter­
ranean area, with the main emphasis on U. S., British and 
Soviet relations in recent years. 
Latin America Josephs 
40 
New York: Random House, 1948. 
492 pp. 
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A report on the present political and economic situation in Cuba 
and in each of the South American countries except Paraguay. 
A straight-forward and apparently unbiased report. 
The United States and China 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948. 
367 pp. 
Fairbank 
Professor Fairbank states that his purpose is "to indicate some 
of the major currents which now form the tide of social change 
in China" and "to summarize the major patterns of thought 
and conduct, the major political and economic forms" which are 
ingrained in Chinese society. This purpose he accomplishes ad­
mirably. 
The United States And The Near East Speiser 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947 . 
246 pp. 
Brief explanation of the geographic and cultural background of 
the Near East, followed by a summary of political developments 
in that area up to the present time. Concise, scholarly and un­
biased. 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
Britain: Partner For Peace Corbett 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946. 
161 pp. 
A thorough study of the position of England with respect to 
the United Kingdom, the Empire, the Commonwealth, and the 
world. 
The Charter Of The United States 
Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949. 
658 pp. 
Goodrich-Hambro 
Recognized as the best work on the Charter of the United 
Nations. A comprehensive discussion and interpretation of 
each article of the Charter. Very valuable for reference pur-
41 
44
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 7, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss7/1
RESTRICTED 
poses and recommended for study by those with a particular in­
terest in international relations. 
Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy 
Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1948: 
241 pp. 
An excellent survey of the basic questions of foreign policy. 
Published annually. Monthly supplements, entitled "Summary 
of Developments in Major Problems of U. S. Foreign Policy", 
are issued by the publishers. 
The North Atlantic Treaty 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1949. 
2 pp. 
Department of State Publication 3464. The preamble and text 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
The Western Hemisphere Defense Pact 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947. 
2 pp. 
The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
Executive Report No. 11. 
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE 
Ah Power In War Tedder 
London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949. 
124 pp. 
A distinguished officer of the Royal Air Force discusses sonie 
of the effects of the impact of air power on the course of 
World War II. 
Bombing And Strategy Dickens 
42 
London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1947. 
90 pp. 
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In this short book the author analyzes and criticizes British 
aerial strategy (particularly strategic bombing) of World War 
II, and reaches several important conclusions concerning the 
use of the armed forces of a maritime power. 
Mahan On Sea Power 
Norman, Okla.: 
300 pp. 
Livesey 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1947. 
An interpretation and evaluation of Admiral Mahan's theories 
of sea power and its effect on history. The list of Mahan's 
writings, which is included, is complete and provides a useful 
guide for anyone who desires to study the development of these 
theories. 
The Future Employment Of Naval Forces Nimitz 
U. S. Department of the Navy, 1948 
12 pp. 
A short paper expressing the views of Fleet Admiral Chester 
W. Nimitz on the function of naval forces in maintaining the
future security of the United States.
Some Principles Of Maritime Strategy 
New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911 
278 pp. 
Corbett 
A classic work on naval strategy by a distinguished British 
naval writer. 
The Atom Bomb 
96 pp. 
Part II (pages 324-418) of the March 1947 issue of "Air Af­
fairs". Articles by officers of the Army, Navy, Air Force and 
by distinguished civilians dealing with the impact of the atomic 
bomb on society. 
The Role Of Sea Power In Global Warfare Of The Future 
From Brassey's Naval Annual, 1947. 
14 pp. 
Rosinski 
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A brief article in which Dr. Rosinski develops the thesis that 
sea power will continue to be a fundamental and decisive his­
torical force. 
The Place Of War In History Rosinski 
From "Infantry Journal", November, 1947. 
7 pp. 
A critical analysis of Cyril Fall's short sixteen page booklet 
entitled "The Place of War in History", which booklet should 
be read in conjunction. 
The Art Of War Sun Tzu 
Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1944. 
97 pp. 
A 1944 edition of the Giles translation. The book comprises 
thirteen short chapters. In the first paragraph Sun Tzu writes: 
"The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a 
matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. 
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be 
neglected". From that point he proceeds to an enunciation of 
the principles of war, and to an examination of their applica­
tion. 
Psychological Warfare Linebarger 
Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1948. 
251 pp. 
Covers the historical background, functions, limitations, and 
applications of the science of psychology to the conduct of war. 
Airborne Warfare Gavin 
44 
Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947. 
175pp. 
A very interesting, well written book by an officer of long and 
varied experience. It goes briefly into the history of airborne 
operations, reviews some of the highlights of the major air­
borne operations of World War II, and then delves into the 
future. 
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The Price Of Power Baldwin 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1948. 
32 8 pp. 
Produced by a group of specialists brought together by the 
Council on Foreign Relations. The book considers the relative 
positions (present and potential) of the United States and Rus­
sia as regards political, economic, and strategic strengths, re­
sources, man power, ideologies, and vulnerability. 
Make-rs Of Modem Strategy (Selections) Earle 
Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1943. 
This book is an outgrowth of a seminar on military affairs 
which was conducted at the Institute for Advanced Study. 
Twenty well known historians trace the development of modern 
military thought in brief, and in some cases brilliant studies 
of the contributions of Clausewitz, Jomini, Mahan, Douhet, and 
Foch (among others) to current military thinking. 
Naval Strategy 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1919. 
447 pp. 
Mahan 
This book is substantially a compilation of lectures delivered 
by Captain Mahan at the Naval War College between the years 
188 7 and 191 1. Naval strategy is compared and contrasted 
with the principles and practice of military operations on land . 
U. S. S. R. AND COMMUNISM 
Sources Of Soviet Conduct "X" 
From "Foreign Affairs," July, 1947. 
29pp. 
A splendid (and brief) analysis of the interaction of Soviet 
ideology and power and the role played by each in Soviet of­
ficial conduct. 
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Stalin On Revolution "Historicus" 
From "Foreign Affairs," January, 1949. 
42 pp. 
An authoritative analysis of Stalin's pronouncements and of 
their influence on Communist thinking and policy throughout 
the world. 
World Communism Today Ebon 
New York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1948. 
482 pp. 
Well balanced and objective discussion of the world Communist 
situation and of possible developments. 
The Strategy And Tactics Of World Communism House Docu­
ment ,#619 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1948. 
429 pp. 
A comprehensive, well documented report by sub-committee 
No. 5 of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. It consists 
of the report proper and two supplements. The report proper 
covers the theory, practice and tactics of Communism. Sup­
plement No. 1 "One Hundred Years of Communism" documents 
and discusses the development and objectives of the Commun­
ists, and is the major part of the report. Supplement No. 2 con­
sists of official protests of the U.S. against Communist policies 
or actions. 
Russia, A Short History Pratt and Moore 
New York: John Day Co., 1947. 
282 pp. 
An excellent history, interesting to read and valuable for 
reference purposes. 
Blueprint For World Conquest 
46 
Washington, D. C.: Human Events, 1946 .. 
258 pp. 
The Communist equivalent of Mein Kampf. It presents the 
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thesis and programs of the Second and Sixth World Congresses 
of the Communist International which were held in Moscow in 
1920 and 1928. 
LOGIC: ENGLISH WRITTEN AND SPOKEN 
How To Think Straight Thouless 
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1939. 
246 pp, 
In direct, sprightly, nontechnical English, Professor Thoule�s 
discusses the most effective ways of achieving and maintain­
ing a clear-thinking, well-balanced and flexible mind. 
The Art Of Plain Talk Flesch 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1946. 
194 pp. 
A book that explains the art of plain talk. People whose busi­
ness or desire it is to convey ideas will obtain valuable hints on 
effective presentation. 
Principles And Methods Of Discussion 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1939. 
452 pp. 
McBurney & Hance 
A textbook designed to help those who lead or participate in 
group or panel discussions, symposiums, and forums. 
Principles And Types Of Speech Monroe 
New York: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1939. 
530 pp. 
Good coverage of the basic principles of public speaking. 
LEADERSHIP 
Generals and Generalship 
New York: Macmillan, 1943. 
36 pp. 
Wavell 
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The qualities that a general must possess, the abilities he must 
have to handle his troops, and his relationship with the states­
men who command his activities are ably presented by Field 
Marshal Wavell in this book. 
Lee's Lieutenants (Introduction to Vol. III) Freeman 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. 
17pp. 
Sketches of the personalities who were the commanders under 
Lee in the Army of Northern Virginia. 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION 
Organization, A Formulation Of Principle Brown 
New York: Hibbert Printing Co., 1945. 
308 pp. 
A treatise on the basic principles of organization. 
The Principles Of Organization Mooney & Reiley 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1939. 
217 pp. 
The principles and structure of organization throughout his­
tory with special reference to successful organizations which 
have stood the test of time. 
WORLD WAR II 
W"ar Reports Of M.arshall, Arnold And King (Selections) 
Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1947. 
A factual and complete official account of the U. S. effort in 
World War II. A basic historical document. 
U.S. Naval Logistics In World W"ar II Ballantine 
48 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947. 
301 pp. 
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The book confines itself primarily to a discussion of National 
and Departmental Logistics. In this restricted field the author 
makes an excellent analysis of an important problem. 
Crusade In Europe Eisenhower 
New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948. 
478 pp. 
A work of great significance by the Supreme Commander, 
Allied Expeditionary Forces. 
Roosevelt And Hopkins Sherwood 
New York: Harper & Bros., 1948. 
934 pp. 
A remarkable biographical work covering the pre-war and war 
years. Sherwood is able to make the reader feel personally 
present in the White House and at the conference tables. 
Scientists Against Time Baxter 
Boston, Mass. : Little, Brown & Co., 1946. 
450 pp. 
The Official history of the Office of Scientific Research and De­
velopment-1940 to the War's end-in which is chronicled the 
contribution of science to victory in World War II. Abundant 
proof, if any is needed, of the decisive impact of science on 
modern war. 
Hitler And His Admirals Martienssen 
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1948. 
244 pp. 
In preparing this text the author has drawn upon the captured 
archives of the German Navy. Between extensive quotations of 
documents he has inserted an interpretative narrative to give 
continuity. Brassey's Naval Annual 1948 contains the text of 
the "Feuhrer Conferences" and is a better source for the basic 
material. 
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The Effects Of The Atomic Bomb On Hiroshima U. S. S. B. S. 
And Nagasaki 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946. 
43 pp. 
A condensed but complete report on the effects of the two 
bombs. 
Arsenal Of Democracy Nelson 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1946. 
431 pp. 
Mr. Nelson sketches briefly the difficulties and problems which 
arose in the setting up and functioning of Governmental Boards 
and Offices designed to organize, control and channel the in­
dustrial potential of the United States to meet the needs of the 
allied war machine in World War II. The book presents numer­
ous facts and details but the coverage is not as complete as 
would be desirable. 
The Second World War, 1939-1945 Fuller 
London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1948. 
431 pp. 
A review of the strategy of the war by one of England's most 
capable authors in the military field. The work is appropriately 
illustrated and incorporates the comments of many top ranking 
German officers. A stimulating and provocative book. 
Summary Reports, European And Pacific Wars U. S. S. B. S. 
Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1945-46. 
32pp. 
A concise report of the results obtained by strategic bombing 
in the European and Pacific Theaters including conclusions, 
lessons learned and future trends. 
The Gathering Storm Churchill 
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Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1948. 
667 pp. 
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No other statesman of our time has such a command of the 
English language and few have played so large a part in the 
making of modern history as has Mr. Churchill. In as much as 
Churchill was Head of His Majesty's Government during the 
period of World War II, he speaks with more authority here 
than in his earlier books on the First World War. 
Their Finest Hour Churchill 
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1949. 
630 pp. 
Volume II of Churchill's history of the Second World War. 
This volume starts with the problems confronted by Churchill 
as he assumed the office of Prime Minister in 1940 and covers 
the Battle of France, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, and the 
African campaign which culminated at Tobruk. 
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